[Translate] In April of 2010 TEPCO signed a contract with high tech security company Magna BSP to provide a sophisticated video and trespass detection system  at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. This was the first installation of what was to be a series of similar installations at nuclear plants around Japan, coordinated between the government and nuclear operators. The system was installed at Fukushima Daiichi in 2010 Two TEPCO workers who were trained on the system weeks before the disaster were confirmed to have been among the Fukushima 50 who stayed at the plant during the worst of the disaster. To date TEPCO has not acknowledged the existence of the system or volunteered any of the video and data captured by the system to the public or the press. This data was never … Read entire article »

[Translate] FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI POWER LOSS There was a back-up 66kV transmission line from the transmission network of Tohoku Electric Power Company, but the back-up line failed to feed Unit 1 via a metal-clad type circuit (M/C) of Unit 1 due to mismatched sockets. The EQ caused loss of off-site supply, because of loss of all seven grid connections to the site. The earthquake caused a lot of damage in the switchyards at the NPP At the nearby Shin-Fukushima substation to whichit is connected and to the circuits between them, including: o Collapse of one transmission tower, built on sloping ground, because of a landslide caused by the earthquake; o Damage to underground cables by subsidence; o Collapse of several high voltage circuit breakers; o Distortion, damage or collapse of several line switches (disconnectors); o Failure of suspension insulators; o Failure of an overhead earth wire (ground … Read entire article »

[Translate] SPENT FUEL POOLS AT FUKUSHIMA FOLLOW ON REPORT “CORROSION” This paper with all graphics, companion documents and tables can be downloaded as a PDF * A companion report that explains the basics and terminology of corrosion as it relates to Fukushima Daiichi can be found here. Corrosion At Fukushima Daiichi Explained This is a follow up to a report that was issued concerning the Fukushima spent fuel pools. The first report captured general design, storage and water quality necessary to protect the spent fuel for re-use or eventual storage in dry casks. At the time the report was written the details of water chemistry within the sfp’s was not known in detail which would have been necessary to more accurately predict corrosion for the spent fuel elements, the structural racks, and the spent fuel liner/interface with the reactor wells. We … Read entire article »

[Translate] Corrosion At Fukushima Daiichi Explained by The SimplyInfo.org Research Team A very critical factor in the aftermath of the nuclear meltdowns at Fukushima is stress and corrosion on metal parts of the reactors themselves and also the spent fuel and fuel pools. In this paper we look at corrosion factors and also the actual pipes in use at Daiichi for the ongoing watering effort. Corrosion The type of metal involved, mechanical loads and the type of fluid in contact with the metal will all impact the corrosion and destruction of pipes and metal. Mechanical loads can include movement of pipes and structures during the initial earthquake, ongoing aftershocks and also movement as equipment broke or shook during the meltdowns. Fluid includes the water that has been sent through the reactor pipe systems, reactor vessels and … Read entire article »

[Translate] Along with the new information about the situation inside unit 1′s containment came some confusion online about the torus situation at unit 1. The Denki Shimbun reported recently that unit 1′s torus had “ a dose rate of about 10 Sv/h was observed in both the PCV and torus chamber.” This omits the significant findings in the torus of unit 1. TEPCO documents the very high readings found under water in the torus as “values of 108 to 109“. TEPCO found levels of 10 Sv/h in the air above the water in unit 1. The water surface was about 8 Sv/h, dropped into the 2-3 Sv/h range briefly then went into these incredibly high readings in the depths of the water inside the torus. TEPCO does cite instrument failure as “However, the dosimeter … Read entire article »

[Translate] INSIDE FUKUSHIMA_ How workers tried but failed to avert a nuclear disaster – AJW by The Asahi Shimbun INSIDE FUKUSHIMA_ How workers tried but failed to avert a nuclear disaster page2- AJW by The Asahi Shimbun INSIDE FUKUSHIMA_ How workers tried but failed to avert a nuclear disasterpage3 – AJW by The Asahi Shimbun INSIDE FUKUSHIMA_ How workers tried but failed to avert a nuclear disasterpage4 – AJW by The Asahi Shimbun This article would not be possible without the extensive efforts of the SimplyInfo research team Join the conversation at chat.simplyinfo.org All content is copyright SimplyInfo.org. Content may also be copyright of other specific original authors or creators and was reproduced here with limited permission. While we welcome the sharing of information or promoting our work, please do so with respect to the large amount … Read entire article »

[Translate] TEPCO released two reports in Japanese last week on order of NISA to explain the soundness of unit 4. Our rough machine translation is available here. The two extensive reports in Japanese were not made available in English. TEPCO has made an abbreviated version available today in English that omits or abbreviates a large amount of very critical information including the seismic statements and floor damage report details among others. TEPCO also released another document in Japanese late last week that has more data on the seismic determinations but was less publicized to the press and the public. In May 2012 we reviewed TEPCO’s available documents on unit 4′s stability and explained them in detail here, and a July 2012 follow up. There are some very critical new admissions from TEPCO in the August … Read entire article »

[Translate] Notes on Unit 4 that we have found recently: Unit 4 machine translated reports to NISA on building stability. There are some new cracks found in west wall http://www.simplyinfo.org/?p=7238   Plant stats before the Aug 29th quake: day before quake http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/f1/pla/2012/images/12082905_table_summary-e.pdf day after quake: http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/f1/pla/2012/images/12083005_table_summary-e.pdf Water flow to the reactors was increased after the quake. TEPCO cites water flow detected IN the reactors dropped yet the pump rates going in were the same. They then increased pump rates and kept them there. Plant stats main page to look up any day’s sheet. plant stats http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/f1/pla/2012/index-e.html Below is in reference to a conversation about Unit 4′s stability: Elicia’s statements fr. TEPCO meeting When the TEPCO officials were asked about this, it was quite comical. First they made it clear that they don’t believe an earthquake bigger than 6 will come. Then one official said that as … Read entire article »

[Translate] Pls don’t post these to other lists. JAMA8_12_minamisomaexposure JAMAfukuworkerstress8_12   Minamisoma Article Notes, Questions, Points Etc. Iodine 131 exposure is not known or included. Exposure level before scans not known or estimated. No dose reconstruction has been done. ICRP (source for the 1 mSv) appears to include external and internal exposure, WBC only internal (needs confirmation) Scans show cesium only, contamination from other radionuclides like strontium 90, plutonium etc are not tested for and not known. Nothing has been done to estimate where people were or their exposure path. The reasoning that adults inhaled and children ate their contamination has no supporting evidence. *The doctor that led the study states that two adults in Minamisoma that had 20,000 and 10,000 bq scans were eating local food as the reason for their high levels. These two people are not in the study.  https://aspara.asahi.com/blog/hamadori/entry/TFKaiDii52 Documented … Read entire article »

[Translate]   The EPA Radiation Standard for Spent-Fuel Storage in a Geological Repository Background Information November 2006 http://www.new.ans.org/pi/ps/docs/ps81-bi.pdf Energy Policy act of 1992 covers rad waste: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Policy_Act_of_1992 “Among the provisions is Section 801, which directs the United States Environmental Protection Agency to promulgate radiation protection standards for the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository. The Yucca Mountain site has been designated by the Federal government to serve as the permanent disposal site for used nuclear fuel and other radioactive materials from commercial nuclear power plants and U.S. Department of Defense activities.” bill text: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c102:H.R.776.ENR: DOE on the 1992 energy policy act http://www1.eere.energy.gov/femp/regulations/epact1992.html EPA spent fuel and high level waste standards http://www.epa.gov/rpdweb00/docs/radwaste/402-k-94-001-snf_hlw.html Uranium millings, tailings etc: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c102:1:./temp/~c102dcLsDK:e10377: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c102:1:./temp/~c102dcLsDK:e10544: USEC http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c102:1:./temp/~c102dcLsDK:e9159: Yucca mtn standards http://www.epa.gov/rpdweb00/yucca/index.html “On December 19, 1984, the Department of Energy selected ten locations in six states for consideration as potential repository sites. This was based on data collected for nearly ten … Read entire article »

[Translate] ***Please DO NOT tweet this or share this outside the discussion group*** This is Nancy’s Symposium outline for the Chicago symposium. Please let me or Dean know if you find something incorrect or that may have been missed that needs to be included. The “findings” section I am working on getting detailed “papers” put together from our previous research or working with the members who did the bulk of the work on those issues to get details put together to document those findings fully. The plan is to publish those papers the day after the symposium as an additional contribution to allow attendees etc. to read more on what we presented. 1. The group, how we formed, why we did it.        *Formed on Reuters live blog *People with various expertise from many geographical … Read entire article »

[Translate] I am posting these here to save space on the live blog chat. Dr. Saji’s new comments sent via email have some insight into the IC (isolation condensers) and early hours at unit 1. He also comments on what he thinks is going on at unit 2 and he concurs with what most of us have been assuming. This is for reference , not for broadcast distribution. Thanks. ———- II. RELAP analysis of “short-termed station blackout.” Among the bulk of report, I found an interesting viewgraph, which describes the RELAP analysis of the short-termed SBO, where the loss of off-site power is aggravated with further gradual depletion of batteries.  It is a transition phase before going into the “long-tem SBO”.  In the latter, the damaged plant lost all measures of core cooling and … Read entire article »

[Translate] Original document http://www.scribd.com/doc/81063063/For-Events-Related-to-Corruption-Investigation-Into-the-Cause-of-Pressure-Hose Events related to corruption of pressure hose Currently in operation in the pressure hose, leaks due to cracks and penetration of the plant have occurred for investigation.  Survey was conducted in order to elucidate the cause of the damage Pressure hose with a twist of penetration of the plant  Twisting of pressure hose has been confirmed at the start of water flow. For start and stop the device is repeated, each time twisting the hose is added, that may have led to the damage. Damaged hose or by adding a twist to the hose (① Investigation) Was investigated how they affect the strength hose.  Whether or not to penetrate the buds of the plant, there is no knowledge. Was investigated through the ease of using a needle to the hose to simulate the bud … Read entire article »