ScribbleLive

These are the petition complaints. Spent fuel is reviewing this issue

mark 1 units by 1979 were found vulnerable to early failure in accidents due to pressure containment issues. 90% chance of failure in severe accident NRC rejects this issue claims regulations fixed this

5 - long term containment integrity, fixxed by wet well vent stack per NRC. Failure of containment even with venting says it is inadequite as a fix NRC accepted this for review

NRC is rejecting this request for enforcement to suspend reactors for review

revoke approval of vent systems at mark 1 reactors - NRC accpeted for review of the vent systems but rejects suspension of these units

accidental or intention airline crash into spent fuel pools - NRC refueses to review this potential accident

critical failure modes of fuel pools and floor slabs - NRC rejects review, claims other NRC actions handles this

NRC refused to take immediate action on the petition in April 2011

Paul Gunter - Beyond Nuclear to take the floor: panel of experts, activists and community leaders.appeal comes after fukushima disaster - asks to suspend these antiquated power plants and asks for due process for the people in US

Speaking on the partial accept-reject by NRC. Containment failures with vent system shows inadequate safety and containment. The gross failure of pressure suppression is key to the petition. Mark 1 ccontainment failure not just prolonged station blackout. But the poor system that can fail in many situations

NRC requires containment to be leak tight in licensing contract

Since 1972 we know mark 1 is prone to failure in accident conditions. By 1989 the venting system was put to save containment from failure. Fuku showed the mark 1 containment is false and breach of contract. Extent of failure as seen in NRC as statement highly rad fuel fragments around fuku site 1.5+ miles ejected from the reactor core. Containment failure confirmed that extensive cesium 307by/kg locations 35 miles from FUKU. Exceeds JP safety standards and show need for larger population evacuation plans.

Gunter done.

called for hardened onsite storage for fuel. includes emptying pools to original low density storage. into dry cask storage in fortified storage. emptying pools could take any 5+ year old fuel to casks.

oyster creek reactor - 700 tons of waste fuel - pool at capacity in re-racked high capacity 125 million curies cesium 137. Up to 100% could be released in a pool fire.
Millstone 1 reactor shut down still has all spent fuel on site in pools. None in dry casks.
Fermi 2 - well over 500 tons of fuel in pool 90 million curies of cesium 137. Pool 4 hours for that pool to boil if loss of water circulation

Vermnt Yankee reactor - 625 tons of fuel - most in pool 100million curies of cesium 137. Dropped a cask onto refueling floor - seismic risk.

Pilgrim reactor 70 mill curies of cesium in fuel pool - none in dry cask storage

TEPCO states recently fuel pools - Aug 10th cycling cooling equipment operated - 5 months later. 3 months unit 2 - 3 months at unit 3. August before unit 4 was being handled

citing book on spent fuel risk. Many mark 1 reactors - series of incidents with fuel pools showing risks are high in US.

did you capture his name? ...

ok

1975 nrc - said mark 1 owners - containments should be leak tight to accidents in design basis. GE was involved in investigation. 16 mark 1 units asked ge for help. GE said - program to test for the contaiment problem. He was the manager of this project.

Some failures at Fuku may have been part of the reactors issues. US people at risk while these uncertainties exist. Investigation must happen soon. Certain limits for all mark 1 units to assure that unlimited operation not continue.