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"[Portuguese] Government to announce today which bidder will buy EDP's 21,35% share"
German E.on or Chinese Three Gorges are more likely to win the bid. economia.publico.pt

I'll let you know as soon as they release the information.

@lillymunster That research paper is plagued with conflicting statements. It doesn't require much effort to debunk their claims. They kind of debunk themselves, lol. I sincerely think they're only looking to get attention into the subject for whatever reason. I don't think they have really found anything.

There will be some guide lines that must be respected. But the Governmental control will be limited from now on. We won't see EDP's administration changing with every elections any longer, which is a good thing, I believe. We have a very strong political faith in the jobs for the boys concept. It's terrible.

"Large Hadron Collider team detect 'new particle'" (John von Radowitz) www.independent.co.uk

@lillymunster I've never figured out how to make RSS work with Google Chrome. I'm absolutely lame on this department.

As to Unit 3, the NISA Sep update to IAEA (pp IV-71) states:
"At 15:38, as a result of the impact of the tsunami, two emergency DGs stopped operating and all AC power was lost due to the drenching/submersion of the cooling seawater pumps, the metal-clad switchgear and the emergency bus of Unit 3.
The inability to use the residual heat removal system seawater pumps meant the loss of residual heat removal system (RHR) functions, resulting in a failure to shift the decay heat in the PCV to the sea, the final heat sink.
However, the DC bus of Unit 3 escaped being drenched. Power was not supplied through AC-DC transfer from the DC bus, but rather the backup storage batteries supplied power to the loads (RCIC valves, recorders, etc.) that required direct current for an extended time compared to those of other units.
Because of the drawdown resulting from the shutdown of the RCIC at 15:25, the RCIC started again at 16:03 and stopped at 11:36 on March 12.
The reason why the RCIC stopped at 11:36 on March 12 is unknown at this time, but the storage batteries for valve manipulation might have become exhausted as more than 20 hours had passed since the RCIC started operation.
Afterwards, the HPCI started automatically at 12:35 on March 12 due to the low water level of the core and stopped at 2:42 on March 13. At that time, the plant-related parameters did not indicate any water level, and so the core coolant injection system stopped as the water level in the core was unknown.
At 3:51, after more than one hour had passed since the HPCI stopped, the power was restored to the water level gauge, which showed that the water level for the reactor fuel was -1600 mm (TAF-1600 mm).
It is thought that the HPCI stopped as a result of the lower reactor pressure."

And on countermeasures (pIV-73):
"In order to lower the PCV pressure after the HPCI stopped at 2:42 on March 12, TEPCO carried out wet venting from 8:41 the same day. From approximately 9:25 on the same day, though TEPCO started injecting fresh water containing boric acid through the fire extinguishing system by using fire engines, the RPV water level still dropped. Even taking this injection into account, this meant that no injection had occurred for six hours and 43 minutes since the HPCI stopped. At 13:12 the same day, water injection was changed to seawater.
To reduce the PCV pressure, wet venting was carried out at 5:20 on March 14."

Looks like tepco is nebulous on the reasons for starting and stopping the emergency cooling system at crucial inflection points. Since the news report on events on March 13, the system tepco operators deliberately switched off must have been the HPCI.

Look here on pIV-74: "When TEPCO’s analysis showed that the flow volume of the alternative injection water was low, it resulted in damage to the RPV due to melted fuel. TEPCO has used these results in addition to the existing PRV temperature measurement results to evaluate that the greater part of the fuel has in fact been cooled at the bottom of the RPV.
TEPCO estimated that during this process the reactor fuel was exposed for about four hours from 2:42 on March 13, when the HCPI stopped (about forty hours after the earthquake hit), and two hours later, damage to the core began. Later, as the reactor water level was not able to be maintained around the fuel, flow volume for the alternative water injection was assumed. The decay heat began melting the core and the melted fuel shifted to the lower plenum and then some 66 hours after the earthquake, it started to damage the RPV.
The analysis results show that, along with the damage to the core and the core melt of reactor fuel, the embedded radioactive materials were released into the RPV and moved to the S/C, with the noble gases almost all being released into the environment through PCV vent operation, and approximately 0.5% of the radioactive iodine was released.
Note that TEPCO carried out an additional analysis, which assumed leakage from the HPCI steam system as the RPV and D/W pressures had dropped while HPCI was operating. The analysis results show that the RPV pressure changes and the D/W pressure changes were generally in alignment, but, including the problems with instrumentation, it is not possible to pinpoint the reason the RPV and D/W pressures dropped, nor their current status."
Steam leaking from the HPCI means that the reactor steam-driven turbines turning the HPCI pumps lost torque and the pumps could not deliver the necessary volume of coolant.