
hi to all...
by dean 6/11/2011 8:15:15 AM

@dean hi
by elainekirk 6/11/2011 8:15:50 AM

I have not yet Ralph.. will read it .. ty
by dean 6/11/2011 8:16:45 AM

I usually read conclusions first.. and see where the gov't admits that "consistent preparations for severe accidents was insufficient"...
by dean 6/11/2011 8:22:27 AM

hi elaine.. I'm up early but will rest more as I have the bicycle event this morning
by dean 6/11/2011 8:23:04 AM

Ralph, we have all been so intimately involved with this event that I would say non of us believe a high degree of transparency has been made. to the contrary, there have been so many documented statements and information released that show just the opposite. I'll finish up the read on this report later today... ty for posting it Ralph
by dean 6/11/2011 8:27:08 AM

I am also sure that the IAEA's response will be peppered with some similar statements of transparency to not only the GOJ but to all citizens globally.
by dean 6/11/2011 8:28:31 AM

@dean get some rest I hope the event goes well :)
by elainekirk 6/11/2011 8:30:57 AM

ty elaine.. I'm eating my banana ha ha ...
by dean 6/11/2011 8:31:21 AM

@dean and yogurt I hope
by elainekirk 6/11/2011 8:32:23 AM

how did you know elaine.. lol
by dean 6/11/2011 8:35:19 AM

I have been speed reading through the report section on lessons learned.. wow
by dean 6/11/2011 8:41:51 AM

@Ralph, it's been interesting to try and see if it's written in the japanese style we have see in the past. There is almost a flare of getting help to restructure the wording to me... thoughts?
by dean 6/11/2011 8:45:12 AM

and some legal folks
by dean 6/11/2011 8:52:54 AM

in my career I have seen the approach to nuclear safety and defense in depth change so much, in addition the changes in seismic robustness and the change in definition of "safety related equipment". In the past and still the auxilliary systems were not classified as safety related but, with out them and even in the event of a robust battery bank, the time dependent control of severe accidents "assumes" human response to HOOK UP POWER after a station blackout.
by dean 6/11/2011 8:55:22 AM

were we ever able to determine why the power was lost the other day at diachi plant
by dean 6/11/2011 9:03:17 AM

will be interesting to find out @ Wolf, I was thinking of a possibility of hastily tie-ing high power electrical systems together for backup capability with out ensuring that back flow or ground fault protection was not installed or not properly protecting the multiple systems due to faults
by dean 6/11/2011 9:14:31 AM

true Ralph, they seemed to have been quickly put together but perhaps not safely protected
by dean 6/11/2011 9:21:09 AM

time for me to rest some more.. will be back later.. nice input Ralph,,, gm Maxi
by dean 6/11/2011 9:30:01 AM

According to the AREVA report, cooling in the isolation condenser in unit 1 stopped at 16:36 on March 11, less than an hour after the backup diesel generators had failed. By contrast, the RCIC pump in unit 3 continued until 02:44 on March 13, about 35 hours after loss of backup power. In unit 2 the RCIC survived until 13:25 on March 14, some 46 hours after the accident.
fairewinds.comby elainekirk 6/11/2011 9:38:59 AM