Japan Earthquake | Page 1582

  • "・Enhancement of public relations
    From the viewpoint of enhancing information disclosure to the public and issuing instructions
    for evacuation, etc. to residents in the surrounding areas, the government will consider
    expanding the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ)and request the local government to review the
    disaster prevention plan, and also establish procedures of publication about the evaluation of the
    accident and the progress of the accident response (risk communication)."
    by Ralph Unger 6/11/2011 8:14:44 AM

  • hi to all...
    by dean 6/11/2011 8:15:15 AM

  • Hi Dean
    by Ralph Unger 6/11/2011 8:15:29 AM

  • @dean hi
    by elainekirk 6/11/2011 8:15:50 AM

  • Did you rerad the report to the IAEA from TEPCO? www.kantei.go.jp
    by Ralph Unger 6/11/2011 8:16:12 AM

  • I have not yet Ralph.. will read it .. ty
    by dean 6/11/2011 8:16:45 AM

  • I usually read conclusions first.. and see where the gov't admits that "consistent preparations for severe accidents was insufficient"...
    by dean 6/11/2011 8:22:27 AM

  • "Japan’s basic policy is to release information about this accident with a high degree of
    transparency. In preparing this report under this policy, attention has been paid to providing as
    accurately as possible an exact description of the facts of the situation, together with an
    objective evaluation of countermeasures against the accident, clearly distinguishing between
    known and unknown matters. Factual descriptions are based on findings current as of May 31,
    2011." Do ya believe it?
    by Ralph Unger 6/11/2011 8:22:50 AM

  • hi elaine.. I'm up early but will rest more as I have the bicycle event this morning
    by dean 6/11/2011 8:23:04 AM

  • Ralph, we have all been so intimately involved with this event that I would say non of us believe a high degree of transparency has been made. to the contrary, there have been so many documented statements and information released that show just the opposite. I'll finish up the read on this report later today... ty for posting it Ralph
    by dean 6/11/2011 8:27:08 AM

  • I am also sure that the IAEA's response will be peppered with some similar statements of transparency to not only the GOJ but to all citizens globally.
    by dean 6/11/2011 8:28:31 AM

  • @dean get some rest I hope the event goes well :)
    by elainekirk 6/11/2011 8:30:57 AM

  • ty elaine.. I'm eating my banana ha ha ...
    by dean 6/11/2011 8:31:21 AM

  • @dean and yogurt I hope
    by elainekirk 6/11/2011 8:32:23 AM

  • how did you know elaine.. lol
    by dean 6/11/2011 8:35:19 AM

  • I have been speed reading through the report section on lessons learned.. wow
    by dean 6/11/2011 8:41:51 AM

  • I am only 1/3rd of the way through it, I will summarize it in a sec though.
    by Ralph Unger 6/11/2011 8:43:58 AM

  • @Ralph, it's been interesting to try and see if it's written in the japanese style we have see in the past. There is almost a flare of getting help to restructure the wording to me... thoughts?
    by dean 6/11/2011 8:45:12 AM

  • "Oops" is what it tells me from what I have read. Is that a lesson learned? :-)
    by Ralph Unger 6/11/2011 8:45:14 AM

  • This report is written by an Anglo for sure. Japanese principals , but good English.
    by Ralph Unger 6/11/2011 8:46:29 AM

  • I would bet $100 that an NRC guy from the US proofread the document.
    by Ralph Unger 6/11/2011 8:49:35 AM

  • Or maybe even wrote it, GE has a lot of money invested here.
    by Ralph Unger 6/11/2011 8:50:38 AM

  • and some legal folks
    by dean 6/11/2011 8:52:54 AM

  • "Injected water vaporizes after absorbing heat from the nuclear fuel in the RPV. Accordingly, the
    inner pressure rose in the RPVs which had lost their core cooling functions, and this water vapor
    leaked through the safety valves into the PCV. Due to this, the inner pressure within the PCVs in
    Units 1 to 3 rose gradually, with PCV wet well vent operations carried out a number of times, in
    which the gases in the PCVs are released from the gas phase area in the suppression chamber
    into the atmosphere, through the ventilation stack, for the purpose of preventing damage to the
    PCV caused by the pressure therein."
    by Ralph Unger 6/11/2011 8:54:19 AM

  • "After the wet well venting of the PCVs, explosions presumably caused by hydrogen which had
    leaked from the PCV occurred in the upper area of the reactor buildings, ruining the operation
    floor in the reactor buildings of Units 1 and 3. As a result of these incidents, a lot of radioactive
    materials were discharged to the atmosphere. Following the ruination of the Unit 3 building, an
    explosion probably caused by hydrogen occurred in the reactor building of Unit 4, ruining its
    upper area. In Unit 4, all core fuels had been transferred to the spent fuel pool for periodic
    inspection before the earthquake. During this time, it seems that in Unit 2 a hydrogen explosion
    occurred and caused damage at a point presumed to be near the suppression chamber."
    by Ralph Unger 6/11/2011 8:55:08 AM

  • in my career I have seen the approach to nuclear safety and defense in depth change so much, in addition the changes in seismic robustness and the change in definition of "safety related equipment". In the past and still the auxilliary systems were not classified as safety related but, with out them and even in the event of a robust battery bank, the time dependent control of severe accidents "assumes" human response to HOOK UP POWER after a station blackout.
    by dean 6/11/2011 8:55:22 AM

  • www.kantei.go.jp Good reading from the report.
    by Ralph Unger 6/11/2011 8:57:29 AM

  • were we ever able to determine why the power was lost the other day at diachi plant
    by dean 6/11/2011 9:03:17 AM

  • @dean I would imagine grid overload, but have not seen the official cause anywhere.
    by WolfDK 6/11/2011 9:09:23 AM

  • will be interesting to find out @ Wolf, I was thinking of a possibility of hastily tie-ing high power electrical systems together for backup capability with out ensuring that back flow or ground fault protection was not installed or not properly protecting the multiple systems due to faults
    by dean 6/11/2011 9:14:31 AM

  • 400 KV vs the running power at the plant 220V is not something that is done easily or quickly.
    by Ralph Unger 6/11/2011 9:16:20 AM

  • true Ralph, they seemed to have been quickly put together but perhaps not safely protected
    by dean 6/11/2011 9:21:09 AM

  • The transformers are bigger then a car and many were damaged by the quake and wave.
    by Ralph Unger 6/11/2011 9:23:21 AM

  • Hi all,
    by Maxi 6/11/2011 9:26:39 AM

  • I'm continue wondering why they didn't continue to cool reactor with reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system , I thing it can be started manually and don't require additional power ?!
    by Maxi 6/11/2011 9:28:10 AM

  • Is this not about 50% of Chernobyl? "NISA estimated the total discharged amount from reactors at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPSs
    according to the results analyzing reactor status, etc. by JNES and presumed that approximately
    1.3x 10
    17
    Bq of iodine-131 and approximately 6.1x 10
    15
    Bq of cesium-137 were discharged.
    Subsequently, JNES re-analyzed the status of the reactors based on the report which NISA
    collected on May 16 from TEPCO on the plant data immediately after the accident occurred.
    Based on this analysis of reactor status and others by JNES, NISA estimated that the total
    discharged amount of iodine-131 and cesium-137 were approximately 1.6 x 10
    17
    Bq and 1.5 x
    10
    16
    Bq, respectively. The Nuclear Safety Commission estimated the amount of certain nuclides
    discharged into the atmosphere (discharged between March 11 to April 5) with assistance from
    the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) through back calculations, based on the data of
    environmental monitoring and air diffusion calculation; the estimations are 1.5 x 10
    17
    Bq for
    iodine-131 and 1.2 x 10
    16
    Bq for cesium-137. The discharged amount since early April has been
    declining and is about 10
    11
    Bq/h to 10
    12
    Bq/h in iodine-131 equivalent."
    by Ralph Unger 6/11/2011 9:28:47 AM

  • Sorry bad PDF paste.
    by Ralph Unger 6/11/2011 9:29:37 AM

  • by Ralph Unger 6/11/2011 9:29:47 AM

  • time for me to rest some more.. will be back later.. nice input Ralph,,, gm Maxi
    by dean 6/11/2011 9:30:01 AM

  • Page 21....
    by Ralph Unger 6/11/2011 9:30:13 AM

  • TY Dean Cya later.
    by Ralph Unger 6/11/2011 9:30:34 AM

  • @Ralph Unger I mean if they were continue to operate RCIC manually there will be no explosion => no leak of water or steam at all
    by Maxi 6/11/2011 9:32:38 AM

  • @Maxi IIRC the valves stuck.
    by Ralph Unger 6/11/2011 9:33:53 AM

  • @Ralph Unger the valves stuck. From where did you get that info ? I didn't found anything about stuck valves , I already read all Routers blog and some more :)
    by Maxi 6/11/2011 9:36:15 AM

  • According to the AREVA report, cooling in the isolation condenser in unit 1 stopped at 16:36 on March 11, less than an hour after the backup diesel generators had failed. By contrast, the RCIC pump in unit 3 continued until 02:44 on March 13, about 35 hours after loss of backup power. In unit 2 the RCIC survived until 13:25 on March 14, some 46 hours after the accident.
    fairewinds.com
    by elainekirk 6/11/2011 9:38:59 AM

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