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The reactor-meltdown diagrams seen half-way through this new in-Japanese video are interesting, seems to outline a plan to extract corium : www.youtube.com

@elainekirk, it sounds like a pipe dream! And the report closes saying it may be problematic because "'advanced technological development' will likely be required."

@Ian Has to be on the YouTube page only .... The embed below do not show the button

@Peter Melzer Good morning and WOW!! The NHK myth-buster programme certainly clarifies many many things for me - a thousand thanks for that. Now this may seem an odd and terribly controversial thing to say, but my earlier fears about the teams of workers tasked to vent have gone. Despite all the ill-informed or misleading reports to the contrary, I don't think there's any concern to be had about the workers forced to manually open the vents - I can find no evidence that any of the venting that took place was manually executed by anyone. If you (or anyone) find some solid facts to the contrary please let me know. I'm convinced our new perspective gives us far greater explanatory powers here. I admit I haven't yet cross-checked every event to confirm the timings, but consider that all the emissions that left the plant have done so under their own steam, so to speak.

In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, when containment was first breached and high-rad gases were being released from Unit 1 reactor, TEPCO made a request to the Japanese government to the effect that they wanted permission to vent should reactor pressures rise to dangerous levels. Permission was duly granted. Despite this top-level authorisation, and apparently in defiance of the govt's later instruction to do so immediately, no action to vent was taken. Why not? Well it simply wasn't needed and would've caused unnecessary harm. TEPCO realised this, and this was why they rightly refused to send their workers into the highly contaminated buildings to manually vent the containment vessels. In fact, by the early hours of 12th March, I`m convinced that everyone concerned in the decision-making process - including the Nuclear Safety Commission who were advising Kan's govt - knew and correctly predicted that venting now would not prevent the meltdowns in any sense, and that explosions due to hydrogen were highly unlikely.

What I believe the NSC did recognise this early on, however, was that a venting story would help cover-up the fact that radioactive material had breached containment of its own accord - this would have beeb a much more serious state of affairs to explain away. The high levels of radiation from such a severe accident would be obviously detectable and it was clear people had to be evacuated from the immediate surroundings as quickly and as calmly as possible. So, in brief, I'm not saying that venting didn't occur - it most obviously did - but beware of conflicting uses of the term 'venting'. From the evidence amassed thus far, I don't believe any of those recorded venting events were planned and scheduled by workers in the sense of them deciding and undertaking to open or close anything manually; they were all naturally occurring breaches and vents - the result of vessel penetrations and the subsequent melt-thrus that followed. By all means prove this analysis wrong, but that's why I don't think you should worry about those particular workers. :)

@Edano Peter posted this link yesterday, when I was enquiring about the venting events at Daiichi: www.nippon-sekai.com
We were both concerned about the doses workers carrying out such procedures would have gotten.

@lillymunster Thanks. Any data is valuable here - any inaccuracies in the stories will likely be obvious.

good morning, es, according to the NHK documentary, Kan's office order venting of unit 1, and with that they meant the hardened venting of the dry well, on Friday night. It took Tepco until the next morning to execute. What was the reason for the delay? By Friday night even DC power was out. The valves could not be actuated from the control room. The documentary explains that Tepco crew did not know by heart where the valves were located. They had to scramble for blue prints. The valves need at least DC to be actuated. Some also need hydraulic or pneumatic support. Crew had to carry car batteries, maybe bottles of compressed air. Kan arrived on the Saturday morning in person to check on the progress (by comparison Jimmy Carter's visit to TMI occurred much later after the Office of the President was assured that there was no danger anymore). Another reason, tepco's hypothesis on the explosions hinges entirely on the idea that hardened venting filled the building with hydrogen.

order = ordered, ;)

@Peter Melzer Thanks. These are my observations on your points:

1. "according to the NHK documentary, Kan's office order venting of unit 1, and with that they meant the hardened venting of the dry well, on Friday night"
Fine, I can underestand this may have been an initial concern, i.e. this decision was based on information provided AT AN EARLY STAGE.

2. "The documentary explains that Tepco crew did not know by heart where the valves were located. They had to scramble for blue prints. The valves need at least DC to be actuated. Some also need hydraulic or pneumatic support. Crew had to carry car batteries, maybe bottles of compressed air."
Yes, I can see there were numerous mountains to climb but still I'm having difficulty believing all the details here. By 9PM radioactive material was known to be escaping containment - rad levels were so high that workers were instructed not to enter the building. I don't yet know quite what went on with trying to fix up the power trucks - either the power system was faulty before they tried to connect the trucks, or they damaged it in the process. But that's something else.

3."Kan arrived on the Saturday morning in person to check on the progress (by comparison Jimmy Carter's visit to TMI occurred much later after the Office of the President was assured that there was no danger anymore)."
Yes, and based on what they knew about the status of all three reactors he would have been foolish to leave it any later. Big-up for the dude :)

4."Another reason, tepco's hypothesis on the explosions hinges entirely on the idea that hardened venting filled the building with hydrogen."
Yes, this hypothesis is being challenged here.

It may not be simple to judge, if Kan's order to vent made things worse in the end. But it is obvious that tepco leaders attempt to unload some responsibility for the explosions onto the government with their hypothesis that the venting backfilled the buildings with gas. The professorial hypothesis in the CNIC meeting may equally valid suggesting that primary containment gaskets blew releasing the gas.

Re: early worker irradiation: We are implementing a measure to reduce the pressure of the reactor
containment vessels,
but, one of our employees working in the Unit 1 was irradiated at over
100mSv level(106.3mSv). Because of absence of industrial physician, so he
will be diagnosed at a later day. www.tepco.co.jp y personal opinion is that he was sent to manual vent.

@Peter Melzer I realise it's a long shot, but after five months intensive study of TEPCO-ese, I can see there's another possible interpretation to the unusual entry you site for Unit 1 that morning.
"9:04: Workers left for the site for pressure venting."
My warped mind reads this as saying uncontrolled and pressurized venting was occurring and workers had to get out of there fast - an explosion was imminent. If there was a hole in the reactor vessel and gases were spewing out under pressure, perhaps they did think to attempt to vent. Perhaps this was their single and most logical attempt to mitigate the impact of the blast that was shortly to follow? And mayber the worker M.I.A. has just picked up on was the brave man who had to carry out this desperate task.

Sorry, that was the 11:00am Mar 12 report.