ScribbleLive

quite big that one wasn't it?

back for a bit

@Edano plenty aftershocks too !! @dean hi

@Edano nearly choked on my spaggetti

hi @ elaine

now we are all together again :)

@Edano strange is maybe not the word...mooooronic to expect us to take them seriously

9 out of 9 checked today.

@lillymunster yup I wonder if they slipped up and gave the number outside the zone who have fallen victim to radiation sickness and chewed their last cud

The government had planned to lift a ban on shipments from Fukushima Prefecture at the same time, but postponed the decision after radioactive cesium levels exceeding standards were found from meat stored at a meat treatment center on Aug. 19. The ban will be lifted as soon as the reasons are identified.
.
Other ranchers will be able to ship cattle for a certain period if radiation levels are below standards in one or more head of cattle in the first shipment.!!!!!!!!!!
www.asahi.com

@Edano so stupid when they do not know the risks of longterm exposure

Still digging through those NRC documents, found some specs on Drywell Pressure thought it might be useful for comparing readings:
Primary containment performance is evaluated for the entire spectrum of
break sizes for postulated LOCAs (Ref. 1). Among the inputs to the DBA
is the initial primary containment internal pressure (Ref. 1). Analyses
assume an initial drywell pressure of [0.75 psig]. This limitation ensures
that the safety analysis remains valid by maintaining the expected initial
conditions and ensures that the peak LOCA drywell internal pressure
does not exceed the maximum allowable of [62] psig.
The maximum calculated drywell pressure occurs during the reactor
blowdown phase of the DBA, which assumes an instantaneous
recirculation line break. The calculated peak drywell pressure for this
limiting event is [57.5] psig (Ref. 1)

Drywell temperature specs in Fahrenheit:
Primary containment performance is evaluated for a spectrum of break
sizes for postulated loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs) (Ref. 1). Among
the inputs to the design basis analysis is the initial drywell average air
temperature (Ref. 1). Analyses assume an initial average drywell air
temperature of [135]°F. This limitation ensures that the safety analysis
remains valid by maintaining the expected initial conditions and ensures
that the peak LOCA drywell temperature does not exceed the maximum
allowable temperature of [340]'F (Ref. 2). Exceeding this design
temperature may result in the degradation of the primary containment
structure under accident loads. Equipment inside primary containment
required to mitigate the effects of a DBA is designed to operate and be
capable of operating under environmental conditions expected for the
accident

This makes me wonder if these valves between the Drywell to Suppression Chamber (torus) could have been damaged or destroyed in the explosions. The function of the reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum
breakers is to relieve vacuum when primary containment depressurizes
below reactor building pressure. If the drywell depressurizes below
reactor building pressure, the negative differential pressure is mitigated
by flow through the reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum
breakers and through the suppression-chamber-to-drywell vacuum
breakers. The design of the external (reactor building-to-suppression
chamber) vacuum relief provisions consists of two vacuum breakers (a
vacuum breaker and an air operated butterfly valve), located in series in
each of two lines from the reactor building to the suppression chamber
airspace. The butterfly valve is actuated by differential pressure. The
vacuum breaker is self actuating and can be remotely operated for testing
purposes. The two vacuum breakers in se

Sorry to be filling the page, this seems like good to know technical info. If this is info that people already know please stop me. :-)

Edano, working my way through, hoping to find those

I found suppression pool temp info - let me know if we need the specs on sensors for that.

I have a question about the Standby Gas Treatment system. This is what treats air from the containment bulb before releasing it to the outside. Is this the same as the "air conditioning" room in Unit 1 where they found 5Sv with the robot? The SGT would be a likely path for pressure and anything else to escape the containment structure.

I found everything BUT the radiation sensor information for secondary or primary containment. Not a thing in those documents. :-(

The radiation sensors don't seem to be considered as part of the safety system water-pressure-cooling. I find repeatedly talk of all these other systems and sensors as part of this. The only mention of radiation levels have to do with the Standby Gas Treatment system but no mention of sensors that tell levels either in the Drywell or at the SGT. Maybe we need to be looking in another set of systems or something else? Do those radiation sensors in the drywell have a use in day to day operation?