ScribbleLive

@MaryW downloading to my hard drive right now. Let me know if there is anyone I should send copies to when done.

Vacuum cleaner dust from houses around Japan tested by ACRO, lots of scary high house dust of course worse as you get into Fukushima www.acro.eu.org

@artnuke jackhammer cranes. TEPCO even had a hand out with pictures of the process. I posted it later in the day yesterday.

TEPCO was #8 on Google Zeitgeist search list of the year. Beat out Steve Jobs www.theverge.com

@MaryW well that maybe, but they have to take measures to contain the radioactivity. i would prefer seeing tents on #3 and 4 as well.

@MaryW but i don't see an alternative to the tents.

... and the next, coming ruin. we will surely see another catastrophe before fuku is scrapped.

@lillymunster i have no idea how to remove 20m³ corium each.

@Edano neither does TEPCO. It hasn't been done

and lift it up thru the bottleneck.

Daini evac zone will be ended at end of December ex-skf.blogspot.com

NRC APPROVES PRIORITIZATION OF JAPAN LESSONS-LEARNED
TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has approved the agency staff’s prioritization of the Near-Term Task Force recommendations on lessons learned from the Fukushima Dai’ichi nuclear incident and supports action on the Tier 1 and Tier 2 recommendations.
Tier 1 recommendations are those Task Force recommendations the staff determined could be implemented without unnecessary delay and for which sufficient resources are available. Tier 2 includes recommendations that cannot be initiated in the near term due to factors that include the need for further technical assessment and alignment, dependence on Tier
1 issues, or availability of critical skill sets. The staff’s prioritization was provided to the Commission in staff paper SECY 11-0137.
In a Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) issued today, the Commission directed the staff to prepare notation vote papers for its consideration when proposing orders to impose new safety requirements on the nation’s nuclear power plants.
“In approving the prioritization, the Commission has taken an important next step in responding to and implementing the safety recommendations of the Task Force,” said NRC Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko.
The Commission also directed the staff to determine whether any regulatory action is required on additional issues identified by the staff as relevant to the Fukushima Dai’ichi crisis.
On one of those issues – filtration of containment vents in reactors – the Commission directed the staff to merge it with the Tier 1 action on hardened vents for Mark I and Mark II reactor containments.
Under the SRM, the staff is to provide the Commission within nine months its evaluation of the schedule and milestones, resources, and implementation challenges for the Tier 3 recommendations, those that require further staff study or are dependent on completion of an
associated short-term action. sent by NRC email in the last hour

TIER 1: To be undertaken without undue delay.

2.1 Seismic and flood hazard reevaluations
2.3 Seismic and flood walkdowns
4.1 Station blackout (SBO) regulatory actions
4.2 Equipment covered under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR)
50.54(hh)(2)
5.1 Reliable hardened vents for Mark I and Mark II containments
7.1 SFP instrumentation
8 Strengthening and integration of emergency operating procedures, severe
accident management guidelines (SAMGs), and extensive damage mitigation
guidelines
9.3 Emergency preparedness regulatory actions (staffing and communications)

Tier 3 are item that require more study or are dependent on other actions in tier 2 or 1.

2.2 Ten-year confirmation of seismic and flooding hazards (dependent on
Recommendation 2.1)
3 Potential enhancements to the capability to prevent or mitigate seismicallyinduced fires and floods (long-term evaluation)
5.2 Reliable hardened vents for other containment designs (long-term evaluation)
6 Hydrogen control and mitigation inside containment or in other buildings (longterm evaluation)
9.1/9.2 Emergency preparedness (EP) enhancements for prolonged SBO and multiunit
events (dependent on availability of critical skill sets)
9.3 ERDS capability (related to long-term evaluation Recommendation 10)
10 Additional EP topics for prolonged SBO and multiunit events (long-term
evaluation)
11 EP topics for decision-making, radiation monitoring, and public education (longterm evaluation)
12.1 Reactor Oversight Process modifications to reflect the recommended defense-indepth framework (dependent on Recommendation 1)
12.2 Staff training on severe accidents and resident inspector training on SAMGs
(dependent on Recommendation 8)

They want to apply the general concepts of these to new reactor approval process. They also mention they need funding for these additional activities. I am sure that will be another Congressional slap fight.

i think it is snowing on teppycam ...