ScribbleLive

@Edano , thanks for the links.

Dang, I wish my technical German were better. I can read everything but the important words. ;)

I am posting more. Essentially they began to assemble coordinators beginning Friday, but did not get much done other than issuing instructions: "On March 11, staff of Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Safety Inspector's Office in charge of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS were on duty for operational safety inspection, excluding a part-time clerk working at the office. After the quake occurred, three office staff including the Office Manager returned to the Off-site Center, around 5 km west of the NPS, and the remaining 5 nuclear safety inspectors stayed at the NPS to collect information. At 15:42 on March 11, the Local Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Headquarters was established at the Off-site Center as soon as receiving a notification pursuant to the provisions of Article 10 of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness. Subsequently, Local Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters was established after the occurrence of emergency incidents pursuant to the provisions of Article 15 of the same Act at 19:03 on the same day. The head of the Nuclear Safety Inspector's Office temporarily acted for the head of the headquarters until the Vice Minister of METI arrived pursuant to the provisions of Nuclear Emergency Response Manual.
However, in addition to blackout due to the earthquake, power was lost due to malfunctions of emergency power source and no communication tools were available at the Off-site Center. Therefore, the head and other staff had to move temporary to the neighboring Environmental Radioactivity Monitoring Center of Fukushima, where they use the satellite phone installed in the building to secure external communication.
The Vice Minister of METI in charge of the Local Headquarters immediately departed for the Off-site Center with staff of NISA and Secretariat of NSC Japan from Ministry of Defense (MOD) by helicopter of SDF etc. at 17:00 on March 11 pursuant to the occurrence of emergency situation prescribed in Article 15 of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and arrived at the Environmental Radioactivity Monitoring Center of Fukushima at 0:00 on March 12. Around the same time, staff of the MEXT arrived separately. From the evening of March 11 to the next day, officials and staff of SDF, Fukushima Prefecture including Vice Governor, Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and National Institute of Radiological Sciences and others arrived. However, the initial mobilization of staff and specialists of relevant ministries and agencies originally expected as members of the local headquarters was generally slow. In addition, the person in charge in NSC and the member of the Emergency Response Investigation Committee were not dispatched immediately to the site, as specified in the Basic Disaster Prevention Plan. The earthquake occurred earlier and other reasons seem to have affected the
mobilization."

As I read it, the inspectors attached to the plant ran, somebody found the key to the fallback HQ, and the guys began desperately dialing Tokyo numbers. At midnight the first VIPs arrived only to find out that the local subordinates were not ready yet, a typical head without body problem.

So we had to move TWICE: "After the emergency power supply of the Off-site Center was recovered and satellite communication system among various communication systems became available, operation of the Local Headquarters became available at the Off-site Center again at 3:20 on March 12. The head of the Local Headquarters directed the heads of relevant local governments to identify the evacuation status, give publicity to local residents, prepare for potassium iodide
and conduct emergency monitoring, screening and decontamination etc. as the activities at
the Off-site Center during this time. Information from the power stations, ERSS, SPEEDI and others was not desirably available at the Off-site Center for some period of time. Subsequently, with high radiation dose due to the progress of nuclear emergency and lack of fuel, food and other necessities due to congested transportation around the site, it became difficult to continue effective operation
at the Off-site Center as the Local Headquarters. "

@Peter Melzer Wow: Information from the power stations, ERSS, SPEEDI and others was not desirably available at the Off-site Center for some period of time. Blanket admission that they were watching SPEEDI from the beginning.

@RadioGuy , coming to think of the where-abouts of the local first responders, they must have been tied up with the consequences of the earthquake and tsunami. SO when the heavy-hitters from Tokyo arrived, it must have been difficult to find local help. That could have happened in any other country under similar circumstances.

Hi Puc. I've been watching the smokeshow for 9 hours: really impressive tonight. I also got the M4.1 earthquake 15 minutes ago. Nothing special, but always scary...

@lillymunster , I recall the great tornado in Alabama last spring. Had that tornado happened near Browns Ferry combined with an emergency situation at the plant, Mr Jazsco would have found himself very much alone down there.

Japanese fish: Confusion as importer fights back thecitizen.co.tz

Govt must release more data on radiation in seafood: oceanographic group www.fis.com

One more... Tainted beef to be burnt www.iol.co.za

Just saw, he now has 4 screens on top and 3 laptops and a mini...He must be a rich kid..

Katz has been doing weekly Fukushima updates since May - he missed last Tuesday's update, as he mentions. The Yokosonews archives are here: www.ustream.tv