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Well that link didnt work Edano

From 1995 through September 2010, 400 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium from Russian nuclear warheads have been recycled into low-enriched-uranium fuel for U.S. nuclear power plants. The first plant to receive fuel containing uranium under this program was the Cooper Nuclear Station in 1998.[1] This program has eliminated the equivalent of 16,000 nuclear warheads. The Megatons to Megawatts government-to-government program goal of eliminating 500 metric tons of warhead material is scheduled to be completed in 2013. Currently, one in 10 American homes, businesses, schools and hospitals receive electricity generated by Megatons to Megawatts fuel.
en.wikipedia.org

I see that thing every day :(

Edano, i lived next to Indian Point before that. Must be a curse on me.

U.S.-Russia HEU Agreement – “Megatons to Megawatts”
The U.S.-Russia Highly Enriched Uranium Agreement, which was signed by Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin in 1993, sought to address the HEU proliferation risk engendered by the fall of the Soviet Union. Under the terms of the agreement, both the United States and Russia created government-owned corporations to act as the deal’s executors. The United States set up the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), while the Russian Federation created a commercial subsidiary of its Ministry of Atomic Energy (MinAtom), Tekhsnabeksport (“Tenex”). The original deal called for Tenex to downblend its HEU to LEU at MinAtom facilities. USEC would then buy the enrichment component of this LEU, accepting it in shipments over a 20-year period. The price negotiated came to approximately two-thirds of the 1993 market value of the entire quantity of LEU (the other one-third being the feed component). USEC would then be free to resell the enrichment component in compliance with relevant federal and international law. Tenex, on the other hand, would retain title to the feed component, and would be free to resell it, subject to relevant international agreements and Russian statutes.
These circumlocutions, though contrary to the laws of physics, are forced by the peculiarities of the uranium industry: though there is only one actual product shipped to USEC – five percent low-enriched uranium hexafluoride – USEC holds title only to the value of the services employed to enrich it; i.e., the enrichment component. According to the agreement, the actual material that has been enriched – the feed component – remains in Tenex’s legal (if not physical) possession. Obviously, it is impossible to physically separate raw materials from the work that has processed them into a finished product. Therefore, when USEC resells the enrichment component, it must provide its customers with the entire LEU product it received from Tenex. This leaves it in a barter debt: it owes the physical mass of the feed component to Tenex. The situation is resolved by USEC’s customers shipping an equivalent quantity of natural uranium feed back to USEC – which is then designated as Tenex’s feed component.
In addition, USEC would reimburse Tenex for the cost of the 1.5 percent LEU that the latter used to downblend the original HEU. The reimbursement was to be in the form of a barter payment of natural uranium, equivalent to the amount the Russians had used (even though Tenex would use 1.5 percent LEU, not natural uranium, for downblending). Tenex would then be free to resell this natural uranium as well.
Problems With the 1993 Deal
Several problems soon arose with the HEU deal. Perhaps the biggest short-term headache was the looming privatization of USEC. Based on market trends, it became clear that the price agreement negotiated in 1993 was overly generous to Russia. Though the U.S. Department of Energy could force USEC to pay these higher prices while the latter was a government subsidiary, it would have no such power after privatization. What proved beneficial to national security was at odds with the profit motive. USEC, therefore, lobbied to have price controls set according to market standards. When denied this request, USEC resorted to slowing the pace of deliveries, greatly annoying its Russian counterparts.
For its part, Russia also created concerns for the agreement. Russia demanded a “price floor,” below which it would not ship LEU to USEC; this price floor proved unreasonable, however, as it was usually well above market price. In addition, Tenex could not ship the feed component back to Russia: according to U.S. law, enriched uranium could be exported only to nations with which the U.S. had signed a fissile material export agreement. No such agreement existed in 1993. Therefore, Tenex was forced to attempt to sell the feed component from USEC’s warehouses in Paducah, or if it could not find a buyer, to await payment from USEC in 2013. The 1996 act that privatized USEC transferred the title on the feed component from Tenex to the Russian government, and ordered USEC to buy the 1995 and 1996 allotments. However, this did not address the basic price issue.
The situation grew even more precarious by 1998, when USEC completed its privatization. USEC administrators openly questioned whether USEC had any incentive to remain part of the deal (under whose terms it could withdraw). On the Russian side, negotiations to sell the feed to a consortium of commercial enrichment companies had stalled. It was under these conditions that U.S. Energy Secretary Bill Richardson and Russian Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeny Adamov met in 1998 to attempt to resolve the remaining disputes. The agreement born of their negotiations, termed the HEU Feed Deal, was signed in March 1999 and answered many of the extent questions. It allowed for the reimportation of the feed component to Russia, and provided for both American and Russian LEU stockpiles for commercial sale or government use. It also codified a new compensation system for the enrichment component; the new terms were significantly more favorable to USEC, as they were firmly linked to market price (plus a 10-15 percent discount). Even these new terms have proven insufficient to make USEC’s portion of the deal profitable; however, the company is no longer hemorrhaging money, and deliveries have, since 1999, proceeded on schedule for 2013 completion. The day after the HEU feed deal was signed, Tenex announced that it had signed a commercial deal with Cameco, COGEMA, and NUKEM – known collectively as the Western Consortium – to purchase most of the feed component.
www.cdi.org