ScribbleLive

Good morning, dean, take asperin, one of the oldest pharmaceuticals for which scientists and doctors still discover good uses. Another good news in this respect is that lipitor is going to be a generic drug anytime soon. That will lower the costs enormously. I prefer a good Pinot, though, :).

@dean, are control rooms always that close to the reactor? Does not that render them inoperable in an radiological emergency?

@lillymunster , that those vital rooms are not hermetically isolated is also something I wonder about. At Fukushima, the operators were not able to access these rooms at times to read the instruments because of the high rad levels.

The rad problem arose early on. Here from p II-88 of the NISA update pertaining to March 12: "In the Main Control Room, because dose was increasing, the shift supervisor made the people on duty move to the side of Unit 2 of which dose was lower."

It bit more from the event log for Unit 1 of this day, which sheds a light on the role of the different rooms, same report pp 86:
"Late at night on March 11 an increase of dose was confirmed in the site; moreover, an increase of drywell (D/W) pressure was also confirmed.
At 21:51 on March 11, admission to the reactor building was prohibited because dose in the building increased.
At around 22:00 it was reported to the NPS Emergency Response Headquarters that alarm pocket dosimeter (APD) had indicated 0.8 mSv on the scene in the reactor building in a very short time. At 23:00 on March 11, radiation dose increased in the turbine building by the impact of the increased dose in the reactor building (1.2 mSv/h in front of the north double door of the turbine building 1st floor, 0.5 mSv/h in front of the south double door of the turbine building 1st floor).
At around 23:50 on March 11, in the Main Control Room the restoration squad of the NPS Emergency Response Headquarters connected a small generator placed for temporary restoration of illumination of the Room to a D/W pressure gauge to confirm the indicated value to be 600 kPa abs.
Therefore, in the Main Control Room materials such as piping and instrumentation diagram, an AM procedure book and drawings of valves, and an acryl board were brought to start to confirm concrete venting procedures such as an operation method and procedure of valves.
At 02:24 on March 12, the evaluation results on the work time with respect to the site operation of venting were reported to the NPS Emergency Response Headquarters indicating that there was only 17 minutes of work time (20 minutes for self-air-set. Iodine preparation needs to be taken.) not to exceed the dose limit (100 mSv/h) in emergency response if in the atmosphere of 300 mSv/h.
At 02:30 on March 12, it was confirmed that the D/W pressure had reached 840 kPa abs (maximum working pressure: 427 kPa gage#).
# 528.3 kPa abs (=427kPa gage + 101.3 kPa)
At around 03:45 on March 12, exposure dose assessment in the vicinity at the time of venting was performed at the Response Headquarters of the TEPCO main office, which was shared with the NPS. Also, although the double door was opened at the NPS to measure dose in the reactor building, the dose measurement could not be performed because the door was shortly closed at the sight of white “haze something like steam”.
In the Main Control Room, with the goal of vent operation, confirmation was repeated about an order of valve operation, valve arrangement in the torus chamber, and how high the valve was positioned, etc. Also, fire-resistant clothes, self-air-sets, APDs, survey meters and flashlights were collected as many as possible as necessary equipment for work."

On communications from the NISA report, pII-78:
"Due to the loss of all AC power supplies, the status of communication tools in the power stations was extremely limited. PHS, normally used for communication among the staff in the NPSs, became dysfunctional, and communication tools between the main control room of each plant and the emergency response headquarters of the power stations where the plant manager, etc. gathered were limited to hotline and landline.
In addition, in the emergency response headquarters of the NPS, the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) had been deployed but due to the loss of power supply, instrumentation device monitoring parameter etc. did not function, thus transmission to SPDS was impossible. Accordingly, SPDS was usable with emergency power supply, however, as there was no displayed data, eventually it was unusable. Because of this, it became difficult for the emergency response headquarters of the NPS to figure out the status of plants and to plan measures on the basis of it."

Hi@all :), i just watched this clip of a nuke missile in flight. Its spooky. Pakistan test fires nuclear-capable cruise missile
www.dailymotion.com

@elainekirk , if we were able to locate these tanks on pictures, we could evaluate what state they are in. They provide the water for emergency core cooling by default.