Japan Earthquake | Page 741

  • gabe posted this earlier. Yet another ball for them to juggle. This bldg is across the road between uniot 1 and unit 2. At 2:34pm on April 17th, power supplies to a common spent fuel pool was
    stopped due to an electrical short circuit at the end of the circuit. We
    are investigating the details of the cause.
    by marie rich 4/17/2011 7:34:35 PM

  • I see Berkeley NUC put up the PEER story. Interestingly enough, a link lower on the page brought up this english.kyodonews.jp story I hadn't seen. Don't know if it was already posted. Here's the meat of it:

    "The academic body's panel on nuclear energy safety has said the melted fuel at the No. 1 to 3 reactors has been kept at a relatively low temperature, discounting the possibility that a large amount of melted fuel has already built up at the bottom of their reactor vessels given the temperature readings there.

    A large buildup of melted nuclear fuel at the bottom could become a molten mass so hot that it could damage the critical containers and eventually leak huge amounts of radioactive material.

    The panel has also said that the fuel grains with a diameter of between several millimeters and 1 centimeter are believed to have settled flatly at the bottom of the vessels, leaving almost no possibility of a nuclear chain reaction called ''recriticality.''
    by radioguy 4/17/2011 7:34:51 PM

  • @e123 That video you posted is VERY good. I highly recommend it to everyone.
    by James Ward 4/17/2011 7:45:22 PM

  • Sorry, correction: the common spent fuel pool is between unit 3 and unit 4, just across the road. Wonder if they can get to it easily enough to restore cooling system electricity.
    by marie rich 4/17/2011 7:50:02 PM

  • Oh hey, by the way, whoever found and posted that last tally of the fuel on hand in the SFPs and reactors answered the question that has been nagging me since the first JAIF report. Why were the numbers wrong. Why was R1 SFP at half strength? Now we see, with the addition of the unused fuel stats, that they had outloaded it down to two, them put in the 100 unused rods they were going to use to trade out R1, leaving space there for the one's they extract from R1 to make room. SO, followup question, what are those unused rods in the R3 SFP made of?
    by radioguy 4/17/2011 7:57:01 PM

  • @radioguy ........
    by elainekirk 4/17/2011 7:59:16 PM

  • @dean or whoever.... We've read here that the brand new rods are cool until they go inot the reactor, can be handled with just gloves. So, do they put them in the SFP first to irradiate them and heat them up? If so, are those 100 unused rods in R1 not just tame rods, but fully charged?
    by radioguy 4/17/2011 7:59:29 PM

  • @radioguy It was stated the other night that the MOX has to be stored in a SFP storage until it is used for the first time due to the strength. So any mox sent to the plant would be in a reactor or SFP
    by Nancy 4/17/2011 8:00:28 PM

  • @radioguy from what I gleaned here is regular uranium rods don't need SFP storage until they have been used. MOX need sfp storage before use.
    by Nancy 4/17/2011 8:01:30 PM

  • So the 100 unused assemblies in R1 SFP were just there becasue they were getting ready to change them out in, what was it, next month?
    by radioguy 4/17/2011 8:01:40 PM

  • @radioguy In the Kyodo News article you posted, the Atomic Energy Society of Japan is an industry mouthpiece and will be highly unlikely to say anything negative about the Fukushima nuclear disaster. For instance, here's the AESJ's brief comment on the INES level being raised to 7: www.aesj.or.jp
    by James Ward 4/17/2011 8:03:32 PM

  • radioguy.. you can handle the new fabricated fuel elements with gloved hands... typically they are stored dry before being taken to the staging area when refueling
    by dean 4/17/2011 8:11:30 PM

  • @James Ward I know. I post those stories straight, but we've had nothing forthcoming for such a while that I take them all with a tonne of salt.
    by radioguy 4/17/2011 8:16:06 PM

  • I saw those latest videos... seems interesting to me at least that we have been trying to determine if the top was blown off the #3 reactor but there seemed to be beams and things in the way... from verticle view and yest they seem to have gotten it with the remote heli... so.. is it our opinion that it was blown off.
    by dean 4/17/2011 8:19:19 PM

  • @dean I think the concrete containment was blown off. There was some question about the yellow containment cap. Jo found pressure readings, if the stats were correct stats showed the outer containment still had pressure until the 20th. Then something happened and it went to normal atmosphere pressure. There are also images of steam or smoke coming out of the reactor well on the 20th. We have heat images with a ring of heat signatures in the reactor well that seem to be coming out of a circle the diameter of the reactor cap. Jo questioned this saying that it could be those steam spurts pre-March 20th were just hitting the underside of the yellow cap making hot spots that way and that the yellow cap is there but on the 20th it too started leaking
    by Nancy 4/17/2011 8:31:51 PM

  • The crane could have just fallen in that spot and not been above the blast beforehand. I need to look again but I don't think the roof rafters are connected to any wall.
    by Nancy 4/17/2011 8:32:59 PM

  • Roadmap (in English) from TEPCO site, these may have been posted earlier
    www.tepco.co.jp
    Links to appendices/reference documents at bottom of page
    by Deirdre 4/17/2011 8:41:49 PM

  • Interesting paper on MOX in Japan following an accident in 1999 www.nci.org
    Given the magnitude of the increased hazard associated with MOX use, one may well ask how prefectural and national regulatory authorities are able to justify this program. The answer can be found in the magazine Atoms in Japan, published by the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum (JAIF). According to the article entitled "MITI, STA Explain MOX Use in Fukushima,"

    "a citizen attending a public forum on MOX use asked `is it true that an accident at a MOX-burning reactor would be four times worse than conventional ones?' The reply was that an accident would result in a large scale of damage only if fuel were scattered outside the plant. Since the MOX pellets are sintered, it would be virtually impossible for them to become powdered and be carried outside the site, meaning that the safety of MOX fuel in an accident was deemed to be the same as that as uranium fuel."

    This response summarizes the flawed logic by which the Nuclear Safety Commission judged that utilities that planned to use MOX did not need to evaluate the consequences of accidents that would lead to plutonium releases off-site. It conveniently allows Japanese authorities to sidestep the serious safety issues associated with the vastly larger actinide inventories in MOX cores.

    This reasoning, which is indefensible on a technical basis, is clearly a result of the same mindset that believed that criticality accidents at the uranium fuel processing plant at Tokai were also impossible. As explained above, MOX fuel, just like LEU fuel, can be dispersed in fine aerosol form in a severe accident with core disruption. One mechanism which has been under study in the U.S. is high-pressure melt ejection (HPME), in which the reactor vessel ruptures at high pressure after melting of the core. This causes the core to be ejected into the containment in the form of fragments, which rapidly heat the containment and in principle can cause it to fail, leading to radiological release.
    by elainekirk 4/17/2011 8:47:34 PM

  • @radioguy Understood. The Japanese media is in a very difficult spot...if they report what's really happening they can find themselves out of business in a very short time.
    by James Ward 4/17/2011 8:52:03 PM

  • @ Elaine - the stuff you've just posted about MOX dangers is consistent with the 1999 Greenpeace submission on MOX that I posted before. It would also make sense of what Jo Lindien was saying about criticality outside RPV's earlier today
    by UKVal 4/17/2011 8:54:43 PM

  • @ Radioguy, I'm glad you're pursuing the fuel rods issue. There's things that still don't add up about what we've been told.
    by UKVal 4/17/2011 8:56:35 PM

  • @radioguy I am still trying to find you stuff @ukval if you see Jo can you point it out to him please
    by elainekirk 4/17/2011 9:04:51 PM

  • @all Take a look at webcam image. Lots of smoke. www.tepco.co.jp
    by LM 4/17/2011 9:06:09 PM

  • @LM - do I see 2 sources?
    by UKVal 4/17/2011 9:08:00 PM

  • @UKVal That's what I see.
    by LM 4/17/2011 9:09:21 PM

  • from #4.
    by Edano 4/17/2011 9:12:09 PM

  • @ Elaine -if I see Jo will do. What are you looking for Elaine? I am thinking if I can get official figures of their stocks radioguy and Jo will spot if there is an abnormality docs.google.com link doesnt tell you much but is a good background to gen up on
    by UKVal edited by elainekirk 4/17/2011 9:12:33 PM

  • @ Edano - possibly although the right hand stream looks to be closer to the sea
    by UKVal 4/17/2011 9:13:54 PM

  • U.S. Nuclear Spent Fuel Pools www.nrc.gov
    by Shadow 4/17/2011 9:20:57 PM

  • good update Nancy, by looking at the video of that area.. there are bolts or studs up on the side of the yellow top and too much of the side of it shows for a normal setting like the area around it is missing
    by dean 4/17/2011 9:23:13 PM

  • @dean Japan use 13% pu to the norm of 5-10% why is that?
    by elainekirk 4/17/2011 9:27:42 PM

  • elaine, with out looking at the physics it's a big question because with more Pu... the less the thermal margin and the closer they run to over heating and bad heat transfer... probably just another thing the NUCLEAR regulator allows
    by dean 4/17/2011 9:33:55 PM

  • also.. I think they get the Pu.. so maybe they are cutting costs by running it at the highest percent as possible
    by dean 4/17/2011 9:34:29 PM

  • elaine.. where did you get that data may I ask?
    by dean 4/17/2011 9:36:46 PM

  • @dean this paper and another I will have to trawl for www.nci.org
    by elainekirk 4/17/2011 9:39:38 PM

  • Table II provides the results of a calculation, performed with the U.S. computer code MACCS2, of the consequences of such an accident within an area of 113 kilometers around a 870 MWe pressurized-water reactor similar the Takahama 4 plant. The release fractions used were taken from a recent U.S. NRC publication.[2] A population density of 550 persons per square kilometer was assumed, similar to the average population density within a 110 kilometer radius of Takahama.



    The three cases evaluated, medium (M), high (H) and low (L), correspond to three different possible magnitudes of the plutonium release fraction. For each case, both a full MOX core and a one-quarter MOX core were considered. Kansai Electric Power Company (KEPCO) plans initially to use only a one-quarter core of MOX fuel, but intends to eventually reach a one-third MOX core. However, in the future, Japan intends to use full cores of MOX, and plans are proceeding to build an advanced boiling-water reactor (BWR) that will use a full MOX core in Aomori Prefecture.
    by dean 4/17/2011 9:46:44 PM

  • Dean, did you catch the really high torus rad readings?
    by Markfm 4/17/2011 9:47:02 PM

  • elaine.. I think the japanese codes allow for less margin in safety, use different population densities per sq kilometer which allows they to use a higher enriched Pu...grrrrrrrr
    by dean 4/17/2011 9:49:25 PM

  • #2 & #3 both listed (B) readings today, 121 & 56 Sv/hr
    by Markfm 4/17/2011 9:51:04 PM

  • @dean : am i the only one to think that this sounds cynical ? i mean the entire nuke technology in general. "safety margins", "pop densities", "higher enriched".
    by Edano 4/17/2011 9:54:17 PM

  • @dean That yellow cap is parked for maintenance on #4. Is that what you thought was up too high?
    by Nancy 4/17/2011 9:56:19 PM

  • Edano,, there have been links posted to explain nuclear glossary. all this information is used in the selection of fuels... poison material.. reflector material ect.. and in the end.. there are margins.. ie' safety factors that must be ensured to protect agains fuel clad failure...
    by dean 4/17/2011 9:56:50 PM

  • nancy.. I thought the video shown way back there was from the little remote heli... and I thought they said.. #3.. maybe I saw it wrong
    by dean 4/17/2011 9:57:35 PM

  • Edan... after all the fuel and physics for operating is done then the radiological analysts take over to figure fractional releases for different accidents which postulates how many curies of istopes or.. percent fraction of the total inventory of source term in the reactor.. or canal will be released.... that level has to be with .. "site boundary " limits and a zone or aread from the reactor source... thus the 10 mile limit, 20 mile limit etc.. and those levels are what one has to back caluclate to make sure no limits are exceeded..
    by dean 4/17/2011 10:00:05 PM

  • @dean The big obvious yellow cap is in #4. The drone videos hopped back and forth between 4 and 3 so may be a bit confusing. We have not seen any clear image of the containment cap on 3.
    by Nancy 4/17/2011 10:00:32 PM

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