OK, there's a new category under Research Projects on houseoffoust.com called MOX in Japan.
by radioguy 6/7/2011 5:37:05 PM
@tenzing I hadnt seen that one I love cnic they are very efficient
by elainekirk 6/7/2011 5:37:23 PM
@Meretisa There is a storm center in Montana, beta readings are up ahead of it in North and South Dakota, as well as Minnesota. It will probably be high for the next 24-48 hours.
by Bobby1 6/7/2011 5:37:41 PM
on SImplyInfo.org, but I had to use that to post the link. without editing. Lazy enough? sheesh...
by radioguy 6/7/2011 5:37:51 PM
@Bobby1 thanks. just got like 10 people on FB freaking out wondering about it. I got 6 people in chat at once and then 4 IMs about it... all in like 5 minutes. was odd. hadn't looked yet today myself.
by Meretisa 6/7/2011 5:39:45 PM
@dean- hello!
by Meretisa 6/7/2011 5:40:01 PM
@elainekirk i think this is very important: It is an extremely difficult task to fabricate such fuel to its specifications, and since it contains plutonium, the pellets have to be scraped into size in a globe box. The pellets go through double inspections. The first inspection is done automatically and measures all pellets. Then a selected number of the pellets that passed this inspection are put through a manual inspection. However, to save time, BNFL employees failed to conduct the second inspection and instead fabricated data by using data sheets taken from previous inspections. This fact was leaked by an insider to The Independent, and the scandal was made known to the public. Results from the MELOX plant in France show that of the 145 tons of MOX fuel fabricated in 1998, 30tons (20.7%) failed the inspection. In 1999, of the 63 tons MOX fuel fabricated, 13 tons (20.5%) failed as well. In short, the technology to fabricate MOX fuel has yet to be established. Investigations into this scandal have led to strong belief in the possibility that data for the MOX fuel for Takahama 4 has been fabricated as well. The quality of MOX fuel cannot even be guaranteed at the fabrication stage. There is no practical technology for MOX fuel utilization. ( By Masako Sawai ) 4 Sep./Oct. 1999 No.73 Nuke Info Tokyo BNFL Fabricates MOX cnic.jp
by Tenzing 6/7/2011 5:40:40 PM
BTW, what we were researching is just the shipments and number of rods to get a count of MOX assemblies since there has been confusion about how many assemblies really are at FUKU.
by lillymunster 6/7/2011 5:42:33 PM
@tenzing have you seen the data on Japans missing plutonium that I put up a few days ago? You are right your clip is very important and there is no record of fuku returning the 'flawed' bnfl mox
by elainekirk 6/7/2011 5:45:47 PM
An important report that eliminates the theory that different concentrations of hydrogen might have caused the different explosive magnitudes between Units 1 and 3 : www3.nhk.or.jp "The agency says about 1,000 kilograms of hydrogen was produced at the No. 1 reactor when the fuel rods began to be exposed 2 hours after the quake and the metallic fuel containers oxidized one hour later. The same phenomenon took place at the No. 3 reactor some 43 hours after the quake, resulting in the production of 1,000 kilograms of hydrogen."
by Ian 6/7/2011 5:46:17 PM
@Meretisa Presumably iodine-131 is one of the components of the beta radiation over there. It seems that there is a problem with re-criticalities at the plant, and it spits out iodine every time.
by Bobby1 6/7/2011 5:47:00 PM
found this in the archives posted by JMV not mox related but very interesting :)
by elainekirk 6/7/2011 5:48:41 PM
This was in my Bookmarks: Japanese Waste and MOX Shipments from Europe. www.world-nuclear.org
by radioguy 6/7/2011 5:49:15 PM
@elainekirk "But MOX is also temperamental. Physicist Arjun Makhijani, president of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research in Takma Park, MD., spoke to TIME earlier in the week and heaped scorn on the Mark 1 reactors used at the Daiichi site. His criticism in that conversation was the comparatively flimsy (by nuclear reactor standards at least) containment vessels used in the Mark 1s. But he's no fan of the use of MOX either."
"What Makhijani means by "accidental criticality," of course, is that the stuff [MOX] just combusts more easily. That's particularly dangerous in a Mark 1, according to some studies. A report by the Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, for example, found that in the event of a core meltdown, a Mark 1's containment vessel has a 42% chance of failing—a whole lot closer to a coin flip than you want with something like a nuclear reactor" That, more than anything, explains why the day began with flyovers by water helicopters. And that explains why we're likely to see a lot more of the same—at least until another Daiichi reactor starts to look even deadlier. ecocentric.blogs.time.com
by Tenzing 6/7/2011 5:49:29 PM
@radioguy : plutonium comes from pluto, eh ?
by Edano 6/7/2011 5:54:02 PM
Report in Japanese that seems to say the Unit 3 blast was a detonation www.tokyo-np.co.jp Can anyone who can read Japanese explain it's main point? A lot of people don't know that hydrogen explosions can be either deflagrations or detonations. The google translation is not so good : translate.google.com
by Ian 6/7/2011 5:54:07 PM
1 June 1998 AUSTRALIA-EURATOM NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS: PLUTONIUM RETRANSFERS: The new Agreement will represent a further refinement of Australia’s advance consent to plutonium retransfers under the 1981 Australia-Euratom Agreement concerning Transfers of Nuclear Material. In September 1993, Australia gave Euratom its consent for the retransfer from the European Union to Japan of plutonium bearing both Australian and United States safeguards obligations; the latter obligation acquired as a result of Australian nuclear material undergoing processing at some stage of the fuel cycle in the United States Under the new treaty-level Agreement Australia will give consent for the retransfer from the European Union to Japan of the small proportion of Australian obligated plutonium which does not also carry a United States safeguards obligation and is thus not covered by the 1993 agreement. www.projectworldawareness.com
by Tenzing 6/7/2011 5:55:51 PM
GSDF colonel recounts fearing for life in Fukushima reactor blast A Ground Self-Defense Force officer who was nearly killed by one of the hydrogen explosions at the stricken Fukushima No. 1 power plant in March recalled Sunday how the blast made him fear for his life and those of his men.
"I thought that if it was a bad blast, we would not survive it," said Col. Shinji Iwakuma, leader of the GSDF's Central Nuclear Biological Chemical Weapon Defense Unit.
The March 14 blast at the No. 3 reactor injured four of Iwakuma's men just as the six-member team was preparing to spray water onto the crippled reactor, which lost its cooling system in the March 11 quake and tsunami and was overheating to dangerous levels.
While the team is experienced in dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, Iwakuma, 49, said that a mission requiring the cooling of an out of control reactor was an "unforeseen" scenario. Iwakuma, who headed out to the No. 3 reactor with five men in three vehicles, was about to open the door of his car when the hydrogen explosion occurred at 11:01 a.m. The thundering explosion and accompanying blast wave sent concrete and radioactive debris soaring about 70 meters into the air, obscuring his view in a cloud of gray dust, the colonel said. "I think the debris fell for several dozen seconds, but it felt like it was for a very long time," Iwakuma said. After managing to get out of his car, he noticed that his men were injured, dragging their legs or holding their arms tightly. "Are you all right? We will get out of here right now," Iwakuma told them. One man had to be carried over his shoulder. The dosimeter they had with them was giving off readings of about 20 millisieverts at the time. Iwakuma said Tokyo Electric Power Co. did not warn them there was a danger of a hydrogen explosion occurring and only said unit 3 was unstable. "Tokyo Electric was desperate to stabilize (the plant), so I am not angry at them," Iwakuma said, but added, "If there is a possibility of an explosion, I would be reluctant to send my men there." search.japantimes.co.jp
by joniver 6/7/2011 5:56:51 PM
@Edano Dang. That means Disney probably owns the rights. ;)
by radioguy 6/7/2011 5:56:51 PM
@radioguy Thanks! That is the kind of info that is actually needed. What I was looking at was JUST the shipping and total rods delivered. Everything else right now just confuses that issue. If there are more than the 32 installed rods at FUKU they would likely be in the SFP. There were also questions about loading 10 year old rods and if there was a newer shipment to Fuku. If there was that would mean the 10 year old supply was likely in the SFP. So determining the stock on hand should be done so it is known exactly what is being dealt with.
@lillymunster : ha, you just made my children LOL ....
by Edano 6/7/2011 5:59:28 PM
@nancy something tells me they loaded the 99 but like you say I will find concrete
by elainekirk 6/7/2011 5:59:36 PM
@elainekirk @lillymunster : is 10 year old fuel still "fresh" ?
by Edano edited by Edano 6/7/2011 6:00:24 PM
@lillymunster Ooohhh... great links in that document, like this: From BNFL Media Brief 4 December 1996, "Shipments of Nuclear Materials Between Europe and Japan" www.world-nuclear.org
by radioguy 6/7/2011 6:03:50 PM
@edano the fukushima protestors asked the same question
by elainekirk 6/7/2011 6:04:37 PM
@Edano That question came up. Is 10 year old MOX still usable? If not where is it. There was also a load for TEPCO's other plant Kashiwazaki-Kariwa but the locals banned the use. I need to dig and see if it was delivered directly there or went via Fukushima.
by lillymunster 6/7/2011 6:04:40 PM
hello to all
by Dean 6/7/2011 6:07:51 PM
help elaine I'm trapped in mod... helppppppppppppppppp
by Dean 6/7/2011 6:08:08 PM
oops..
by Dean 6/7/2011 6:08:12 PM
ty elaine I'm out now
by Dean 6/7/2011 6:08:24 PM
@dean sorry :) glad somebody rescued you
by elainekirk 6/7/2011 6:09:16 PM
I'm having a heck of a time trying to log into chrome... used the same name and new password even ..
by Dean 6/7/2011 6:10:11 PM
elaine/lilly/Edano... any areas you want me to focus on now?
by Dean 6/7/2011 6:13:23 PM
@dean I think we are on a mox hunt
by elainekirk 6/7/2011 6:14:30 PM
If you have a chance to read this document. Is this theory of a hydrogen detonation make any sense? The translation is kinda hard to read also. translate.google.com
by lillymunster 6/7/2011 6:14:35 PM
looking for mox shipments to try to determine total assemblies and their location. There was a question if there was more than the 1999 32 assemblies at FUKU
I will start to dive into the MOX shipments/accountability
by Dean 6/7/2011 6:26:25 PM
@dean enjoy :)
by elainekirk 6/7/2011 6:26:48 PM
@Bobby1 family has been having choking/asthma issues. thyroid problems run in family. Been telling them it is just the high pollen. Am I right or should we be concerned??
by Meretisa 6/7/2011 6:26:51 PM
@Dean, I have a spreadsheet started with what we know or have so far.