ScribbleLive

7 June vs. 6 June plant parameters. #1 shows another burst on DW SC B reading, rising from 35.5 to 247 Sv/hr, with a small rise on the A reading; other parameters stable or decreasing slightly. #2 RPV bellows temp shows a drop from 75 to 43C, other parameters stable or slow decrease. #3 RPV temps up 4 - 6C, at 146/182C, mixed changes in DW temps at 177/157C, other parameters stable or slight decrease. #5 and #6 have some ups, some downs, all temps under 50C.

"Mixed oxide fuel (MOX fuel) is a combination of plutonium oxide and uranium oxide. It is similar to CSNF containing only uranium oxide. The fuel pellets and fuel rod cladding are exactly the same in both cases. The pellets are fabricated in a similar manner in that milled powders are blended together, compacted, and sintered, except extra precautions are taken to isolate the workers against exposure to plutonium-containing powders. The cladding will be identical to the current state-of-the-art cladding now utilized by fuel vendors to take advantage of improved process controls and materials. A summary report by Seibold et al. (2000 [DIRS 172859]) compares the performance of the improved claddings for boiling water reactors and pressurized water reactors. Since MOX fuels will utilize improved cladding, they will likely have better performance." pbadupws.nrc.gov

"4. Conclusion
We have reported the observations made on the oxidation
of spent fuel stored successively for 10 years in
dry air and 15 years in a moist environment. Even
though oxidation has occurred, the spent fuel still shows
a generally good condition.
Based on the microscopic observations and (semiquantitative)
calculations of the amount of reacted UO2
in spent MOX fuel stored for 25 years in dry air and the
spent UO2 fuel in the current study, it is found that
moisture enhances the oxidation rate, also at ambient
temperatures. The oxidation affects first the grain
boundaries, and several stages could be identified. First,
the grain boundary bonding is weakened, followed by an
enhanced sensitivity to chemical attack, grain boundary
decohesion and finally the onset of bulk oxidation of the
UO2 grains." www.sckcen.be

where I worked we performed "oxide" measurements to ensure the oxide layer was within specs for all new and re-used fuels

“If the citizen groups had not been successful, there would have been a 33% load of MOX at Fukushima Daiichi 3 instead of the current 5% and there would have been MOX in the spent fuel pool,” said Kamps. “The activists have saved countless lives by preventing what might have been a worse disaster than is already taking place.”

interesting lilly, in USA new fuel elements are considered in the security plans at facilities, and are not considered self protecting until they have reached a certain burn up level... then they are hot radioactively such that terrorists cannot take them with out dying. If the ones that are not self protecting are put in the POOL's, then they need extra security measures in place

lilly.. that sure makes it vulnerable to transport and handle with out compromising the security of the fuel

"Fukushima 1-3 Begins Operating with MOX Fuel

On September 18, 2010 Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) started up its Fukushima I-3 Nuclear Power Plant (BWR, 784MW) using MOX fuel. It loaded MOX fuel into the reactor on August 21 and plans to begin generating electricity on the 23rd.

Over 10 years had passed since this fuel was fabricated. It was fabricated between 1997 and 1998 and arrived at the nuclear power station in 1999, but it was never loaded. Falsification of fuel quality control data for MOX fuel for Kansai Electric Power Company's Takahama-3&4 nuclear power plants was discovered and troubles and cover-ups were discovered at TEPCO nuclear power plants. In response, the prefectural government revoked its agreement with TEPCO. On January 20 2010, TEPCO applied again for permission to use MOX fuel and on August 6 the governor gave his consent." www.abovetopsecret.com

@Reed : yes, if it's true ...

@elainekirk 6-8%

"If there is an accident at Fukushima I-3

Exposure doses for residents resulting from a diffusion of radioactivity caused by a severe accident at Fukushima I-3 were calculated by applying the same method used in the disaster assessment in 'WASH-1400', an accident analysis report produced by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

The plan to burn MOX fuel in light water reactors is called the pluthermal program in Japan. In the core of a pluthermal reactor, there are ten times more actinides such as plutonium, americium, and curium than the core of a uranium reactor. Actinides cause serious internal exposure in human bodies and thus pose a very serious threat to human health.

In short, exposure doses resulting from an accident at a pluthermal reactor would be twice those produced by an accident at a uranium reactor. A given exposure dose would be received by residents over twice the distance. The overall affected area would be four times larger. When fatalities by cancer from an accident at a pluthermal reactor is calculated with an assumption that Tokyo was downwind, the number of cancer fatalities would increase from 0.4 million in the case of an accident at a uranium reactor to 10.6 million. In view of such risks, MOX utilization is simply too dangerous. "
By Chihiro Kamisawa
/pg1">www.abovetopsecret.com

"Japan's pluthermal program (using MOX fuel) began in 2009, ten years later than planned. Plutonium shipped and loaded into reactors is reflected in the figures in these tables. The 1,458 tons of plutonium held as "Unirradiated new fuel at reactor sites etc." includes 210 kg at Fukushima I-3 (TEPCO), 205 kg at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa-3 (TEPCO), 213 kg at Hamaoka-4 (Chubu) and 831 kg at Ikata-3 (Shikoku). (The figures don't add up due to rounding.) The plutonium held at Tokyo Electric Power Company's (TEPCO) reactors was shipped there in MOX fuel over ten years ago. The plutonium held at Chubu Electric's and Shikoku Electric's reactors arrived in MOX fuel from France in May 2009. MOX fuel for Kyushu Electric's Genkai-3 plant (677 kg) also arrived in May 2009, but it was loaded in the same year, so it is included in "Plutonium loaded in nuclear reactors" under "Separated Plutonium in Use". The remaining 669 kg of the total 1,345 kg plutonium loaded in nuclear reactors was loaded in Monju last year. (Monju started up in May this year.)

Hideyuki Ban (CNIC Co-Director)" www.abovetopsecret.com

so where has it been stored all the time ?

the MOX problem is not even mentioned by tepco or the japanese media. i wonder if the people are aware of it.