
www.beyondnuclear.org Charter for the NRC task force evaluation for near term changes due to fukushima
by dean 6/19/2011 1:24:09 PM

@angie I will sign out
by elainekirk 6/19/2011 1:24:28 PM

www.gereports.com modifications recommended @ Angie
by dean 6/19/2011 1:28:35 PM

LOL I had to auto approve Elaine. :-)
by lillymunster 6/19/2011 1:34:03 PM

lookie at all the pretty icons... nice.. maybe I'll paint a pretty colorful painting
by dean 6/19/2011 1:37:57 PM

elaine.. I'm sure they didn't and that the design would have had some assumptions which as we see were not correct for hypothetical accidents or combination of failures
by dean 6/19/2011 1:38:58 PM

rest well Angie.
by dean 6/19/2011 1:39:13 PM

I have to finish the one I started last week.. then will do a nice bright one
by dean 6/19/2011 1:39:48 PM

www.physicsforums.com @lilly and @all.. check out the entry at 3-25-11, 09:29.. it even has a hand sketched explosion path for 3
by dean 6/19/2011 1:44:20 PM

Trench water levels
ex-skf.blogspot.comby lillymunster 6/19/2011 1:45:30 PM

true elaine, also interesting .. of 23 reactors in the usa who would have made the modifications (which were not mandatory) 22 made them and 1 did not and said they felt they had other mechanisms within the plant to handle that accident situation..
by dean 6/19/2011 1:45:35 PM

@dean I remember hearing early on how the venting system was mandatory in the US but up to plant owners in Japan. This was cited at a failing in Japan, now to find out it was the same situation here?
by lillymunster 6/19/2011 1:47:46 PM

news.nuclear.com this is No NRC orders were issued to require installation of a hard pipe vent, and all modifications made were voluntarily. Licensees were allowed to justify not installing the hard pipe vent based on plant unique configuration and circumstances. All 23 BWR Mark I plants either installed the modification described in the generic letter (22 plants), or justified use of existing plant safety features (one plant). Installation of the vent was designed to improve safety of the plants in the U.S.
what I just read...
by dean 6/19/2011 1:51:53 PM

I saw that document one time Peter, it is a gem... I know from experience that relief valves for high pressure systems are very temperamental and for those big ones at nuc plants, when they lift, the pressure surge and shock on the system is horrendous. It would be good to get the maintenance procedure for some of the bigger SRV's and see how they test them..
by dean 6/19/2011 1:58:13 PM

yes @ Peter,
by dean 6/19/2011 1:58:35 PM

The Reactor Accident off gas system (shielded filtration - carbon and HEPAs) is within the reactor building. I am assuming it worked until the station black out. Then the valves failed shut. I do not know if they had hydrogen igniters on the system (but doubt). The system is located above the reactor vessel level of the plant. That could have been the location of the first expolsions and when damaged the gas vented naturally to the reactor building via numerous paths, eventually finding their way to the top of the reactor building (reactor work platform area). The other off-gas system is the normal one that allows filtration and decay of radioactive short lived gases and is generally under ground with a long decay loop before heading for the stacks. I have inplant experience with several of the BWR models, but am getting long in the tooth, and my memory gets sketchy at times. Also, I have little patience with conjecture based on hearsay and not facts. A QUOTE from one man on the physics forumn
by dean 6/19/2011 2:01:17 PM